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POWER ALLOCATIONS AND PROFESSIONAL HIERARCHY
IN THE ILLINOIS HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Patrick M Callahan
I. INTRODUCTION
Nurse Sarah Dock, R.N., of Paducah, Kentucky, detailed her perspec-
tive on the proper relationship between nurses and doctors at the start of
the 20th century.' Nurses are born and then trained, she explained, and
women possess the qualities that "naturally make [them] superior to the
average man for this work." 2 According to Nurse Dock's viewpoint, one
of the most important components of the scope of her profession is the de-
gree of deference nurses ought to give to medical doctors: the "first law
and the very cornerstone" of a reliable nurse is obedience to them. 3 A
proper nurse will "obey without question," and will not risk further profes-
sional opportunities by second-guessing the physicians' expertise.'
Nurse Dock's account of professional responsibility ought to be con-
trasted with Bernard Shaw's 1906 play, "The Doctor's Dilemma."' A
commentary on modern Western medicine, Shaw's protagonist, Dr.
Colenso Ridgeon, is thrust into an ethical quandary whereby he must allo-
cate scarce resources.6 He developed a new cure for tuberculosis, but only
has enough of the remedy for one of his several patients.! He is forced to
choose between his poor professional colleague, and the husband of the
woman he loves.' The entire opus is a commentary on medical decision-
making, and the frequent inability of doctors to sort through a complicated
amalgam of motives and interests ("Can this man make better use of his
leg than I of fifty pounds?").'
Nurse Dock and Shaw's Dr. Ridgeon evoke a perplexing question
1. Sarah E. Dock, The Relation of the Nurse to the Doctor and the Doctor to the Nurse, 17 American Jour-
nal of Nursing 394, 394 (1917).
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. "The Doctor's Dilemma (play)," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TheDoctor's ilemma_(play)
(last accessed March 3, 2010).
6. Bernard Shaw, "The Doctor's Dilemma," London: Nabu Press (1957).
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Shaw, supra note 6.
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
that not only predated them, but also continued well beyond their time:
what authority ought to be given to doctors? In stating that nurses ought to
be subservient, Dock reveals an appreciation for doctors' exclusive author-
ity and control in decision-making. Dr. Ridgeon's tumultuous moral esca-
pade implies that Dock's assumption of infallibility is not only misguided,
but also somewhat dangerous. Is a doctor's unchecked power the proper
balance of a well-established and efficient healthcare system? Or is it the
reflection of a historically persistent hierarchy that threatens the welfare of
consumers of medical services?
The debate over the proper relationship between healthcare profes-
sionals is played out among caregivers daily in hospitals and medical of-
fices. Significantly, however, the debate also took root in professional ad-
vocacy. Professional groups - through individual care providers, their
associations, and their review boards - are bitterly scrambling for control.
State and federal associations are waging strategic campaigns to ensure the
success and rank of their members. This article explores the ways in
which the different professional groups attempt to affect power alloca-
tions.
The debate, too, has taken root rather significantly in American law.
Through enabling statutes and practice acts, every state has taken at least
remedial steps to define the proper balance of authority.'o In subsequent
legislation, political leaders are writing into law more detailed and thor-
ough resolutions to medical turf wars." Public representatives - people
who likely have no medical or healthcare experience beyond their attempts
to regulate the system - are helping to design a medical hierarchy: they de-
termine who can (or cannot) perform particular procedures, who has au-
thority over whom, and what the penalties are for violating another
group's power.12
Of course, the writing of a law is only the beginning. Inseparable
from the existence of laws is the need to litigate them. Professional asso-
ciations, individual practitioners, patients, and state regulators often turn to
the courts to settle disputes that reinforce or induce power allocations.
With the resolution of each suit, courts are affecting the hierarchy - either
by modifying it, or reinforcing professional groups' preexisting positions
within it.
Lastly, the inarguably most important component of this article is its
10. Edward P. Richards, "The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A Historical Review
and Guide for Medical Licensing board Regulation of Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Or-
ganizations," 8 Annals of Health Law 201 (1999).
11. Richards, supra note 10.
12. Ibid.
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analysis of the implications of these power allocations for patients. Health-
care systems are only "good" inasmuch as they serve their ailing consum-
ers. Every power allocation made through advocacy, legislation, and liti-
gation says something about future patients' healthcare experiences and
opportunities. A persistent justification for the allocation of power is an
interest in quality control; authority is frequently given to one professional
group exclusively so that they may ensure patients receive the highest
quality services. However, power may also be allocated to particular pro-
fessional groups to address patients' inability to access the services
through its more typical means; by dispersing the power to an additional
group, patients may be able to obtain care where they otherwise could not.
Further, exclusive power allocations can drive up costs, burdening patients
who purchase their services, if not preventing them from receiving care al-
together. This paper argues that the most appropriate hierarchy in the
healthcare system is one that maximizes the patient population's position
relative to three factors that severely dictate patient experiences within the
system: quality, access, and cost.
II. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY
The professional hierarchy in healthcare is generally established
when participants in the healthcare realm work to define the practice of
medicine. For legal purposes, the practice of medicine refers to the scope
of services that may be rendered exclusively by licensed physicians." De-
fining the practice more specifically is a process of boundary setting,
whereby various professions attempt to categorize what qualifies as medi-
cine, and what does not. The process is both imperfect, and continuous.1
The process often fails to account for overlapping competences in different
professional groups." Unfamiliar legislators and judges may obfuscate the
particularities of the nature of diagnoses and treatments. 6 As new proce-
dures, technologies, and information are introduced into the healthcare fo-
rum, the authority to govern them and their uses is shaped through a range
of modes: 1) legislative activism, 2) government administration, 3) profes-
sional lobbying and advocacy, and 4) litigation. First is a discussion on
legislative and professional efforts to define the practice of medicine; these
are preliminary sources of authority that place healthcare actors in a hier-
13. Barry Furrow, et al., Health Law, Cases, Materials and Problems 150 (6th ed. 2008).
14. Lori Rinella, The Use of Medical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation - Should Prac-
tice Guidelines Define the Standard of Care?, 64 UMKC L. Rev. 337 (1996).
15. Furrow, supra note 13, at 150.
16. Ibid.
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archy. The following section will discuss how this hierarchy is regularly
reinforced in case law.
A. Legislative Sources of Authority
Every state has, at a most basic level, health profession practice
acts. 7 Written under the authority of the state's police powers delineated
by the United States Constitution, these acts recognize the legitimacy of
various health practices (medical and non-medical), define the scope of the
practices, and sometimes create regulatory boards with the authority to
continue shaping the legal framework of the practice of the profession."
These practice acts enable professional groups to defend their expertise; in
other words, the acts enable them to claim healthcare "turf' as belonging
to them.' By describing standards, and setting out penalties for failing to
meet the standards, the practice acts are granting the named professionals
the authority to regulate the type of care patients may receive, and the
ways in which they may receive it.20 Similarly, it enables groups to assert
under color of law that turf does not belong to particular other profes-
sions.21 Health practice acts directly allocate power to types of health pro-
fessionals, and can be used to establish hierarchy and authority in the gen-
eral healthcare system. It is the foundation upon which all further power
allocations are made.
One of the biggest sources of hierarchy in health profession acts is
the licensing requirement states use to limit access to those professions.
Licenses are required of practitioners before they can legally participate in
their profession.2 2 Once licensed, the licensees must confine their behavior
within the perimeters laid out by their relevant practice acts." Licensees
who fail to comply are subjected to a host of disciplinary actions ranging
from simple reprimands to binding orders to discontinue professional prac-
tice altogether.24 Licenses do not just bestow upon its holder the permis-
sion to participate in the profession: they carry with them substantial and
serious obligations, as well.
17. Rinella, supra note 14.
18. James W. Hilliard & Marjorie E. Johnson, State Practice Acts of Licensed Health Professions: Scope of
Practice, 8 DePaul J. Health Care L. 237, 237 (2004).
19. Hilliard, at 251.
20. Id. at 252.
2 1. Id.
22. Elizabeth Harrison Hadley, Nurses and Prescriptive Authority: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 15
Am. J. L. and Med. 245, 248 (1989); see also Illinois Medical Practice Act, 225 ILCS 60 (1987).
23. Hadley, at 248.
24. Id.
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By acquiring and following the proscriptions of a professional li-
cense, individual caregivers themselves reinforce the power allocations
made by the practice acts. This is especially true where they explicitly
designate caregivers' positions relative to one another. For example, the
license to practice medicine is a significant piece of ammunition in the
fight for turf among the healthcare profession.2 5 Only individuals possess-
ing the degrees of doctor of medicine, doctor of osteopathy, and doctor of
chiropractic are eligible to hold a medical license in the state of Illinois.26
In the Medical Practice Act, specific references are made to a duty
imposed on medical licensees to adequately collaborate with and provide
medical direction to licensed advanced practice nurses, as medically nec-
essary within a given context.27 Further, Section 54.5 of the Act provides
medical licensees the power to delegate to other types of licensees.28 First,
the Act specifies that physicians with medical licenses "may delegate care
and treatment responsibilities to a physician assistant" in accordance with
the Physician Assistant Practice Act of 1987.29 The Act then states that
physicians licensed to practice medicine may "collaborate with an ad-
vanced practice nurses" - like certified nurse practitioners, certified nurse
midwives, and clinical nurse specialists - according to the Nursing and
Advanced Practice Nursing Act.30 Collaboration is dependent upon the
physician's formulation and approval of orders or guidelines, provision of
direction and consultation, and his or her availability through telecommu-
nications for consultations, complications, referrals, and emergencies.3'
This same arrangement is detailed for certified registered nurse anesthe-
tists, as well.32 Physicians supervising advanced practice nurses are re-
25. See Cheryl Clark, "Doctors Sue to Stop Unsupervised Nurse Anesthetists from Administering Anesthe-
sia," HealthLeaders Media, http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/PHY-245956/Doctors-Sue-To-
Stop-Unsupervised-Nurse-Anesthetists-from-Administering-Anesthesia.html (last accessed March 3, 2010),
and American Medical Association v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975) (involving a suit over the
state's reform to utilization review practices).
26. 255 ILCS 60/13. While Illinois recognizes chiropractors as medical practitioners, other states do not.
27. See 225 ILCS 60/54.5.
28. 225 ILCS 60/54.5(a).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The language of the statute's provision reading "joint formulation and joint approval of orders or
guidelines with the advanced practice nurse" may initially confuse the power allocation being made. Medi-
cal licensees possess the authority to make and approve of orders and guidelines independently of advanced
practice nurses. Here, the Act is essentially conveying the requirement that advanced practice nurses may
not formulate or approve of orders or guidelines without the consent and authority of a medical licensee.
The only burden being placed on medical licensees is the expectation that they make use of their power by
furnishing this consent and authority where appropriate. This is further proved by the reminder § 54.2(a)
that the Act is not to be construed so as to limit a medical licensee's duties or powers to delegate to licensed
practical nurses, registered professional nurses, or other personnel.
32. 225 ILCS 60/54.2(a). It is important to note that the Medical Practice Act does not require a physician
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quired to have access to the medical records of all patients attended to by
those nurses. 3 The Act goes on to state that it is not to be construed so as
to limit the delegation powers or the duties to licensed practical nurses, or
registered professional nurses.34 Despite all of the supervisory powers
medical licensees are granted over other non-medical licensees, the Act
further distinguishes medical licensees by granting them immunity from
suits stemming to the performance of non-medical licensees who appear to
be sufficiently competent." The only restrictions for medical licensees ap-
pearing within the entirety of the Act are those imposed by the Illinois
state government or the medical professions themselves."
The licensing requirements for non-medical caregivers reinforce the
Medical Act's power allocations. While non-physician providers play an
imperative role in the provision of medical services, they are not practicing
medicine in the legal sense; instead, they partake in their own separate li-
censure programs. Through them, they are certified to practice their par-
ticular field - something that does not qualify as "medicine"." Nurses, for
example, do not practice medicine: they practice nursing. Further, they do
so under the supervision and control of the medical practitioners." In the
Nursing and Advanced Practice Nursing Act ("Nursing Act"), many provi-
sions refer to the requirement that licensed nurses or advance practice
nurses operate with specific and continuous oversight by physicians li-
censed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987. As early as the definitions
section of the Nursing Act, medical licensees are allocated power over the
nursing licensees: "registered professional nursing practice" includes as
one of its basic tenets the administration of medications and treatments
only as prescribed by a physician licensed to practice medicine, a licensed
to discuss and agree to an anesthesia plan when an anesthesiologist is providing the anesthesia services; that
duty is only imposed when a certified registered nurse anesthetist renders the services. Pollacheck v. De-
partment of Professional Regulation, 854 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). Currently, however, nurse anes-
thetists are pushing for additional independence from physicians. Amy Lynn Sorrel, "Scope of practice ex-
pansions fuel legal battles," American Medical News, http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2009/03/09/prl20309.htm (last accessed March 1, 2010).
33. 225 ILCS 60/54.5
34. Id.
35. See 225 ILCS 60/23. "Immunity from prosecution. Any individual or organization acting in good faith,
and not in a willful and wanton manner, in complying with this Act by providing any report or other infor-
mation to the Disciplinary Board or a peer review committee, or assisting in the investigation or preparation
of such information, or by voluntarily reporting to the Disciplinary Board or a peer review committee in-
formation regarding alleged errors or negligence by a person licensed under this Act, or by participating in
proceedings of the Disciplinary Board or a peer review committee, or by serving as a member of the Disci-
plinary Board or a peer review committee, shall not, as a result of such actions, be subject to criminal
prosecution or civil damages."
36. For examples, see 225 ILCS 60/6 and 225 ILCS 60/10.
37. See 225 ILCS 65/50-10.
38. 225 ILCS 60/54.5.
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dentist, a licensed podiatrist, or a licensed optometrist.39 The Nursing Act
explicitly defines the scope of particular types of nursing licenses, and it
notes that Licensed Practical Nurses are responsible for the tasks delegated
to them by higher-ranking nurses, as well as physicians, dentists, and po-
diatrists.40 To a lesser degree, the scope of practice for Registered Nurses
also references the supervisory powers possessed by medical licensees,
where registered nurses develop plans of nursing care to be integrated with
the strategies, regimens, and prescriptions authorized by medical licensees
and other healthcare professionals. 4 1 While medical licensees in the Medi-
cal Practice Act are only accountable to themselves and the state govern-
ment, the Nursing Act demonstrates that nurses are accountable to them-
selves, the state, and to physicians.
The Nursing Act constructs the power allocations much more clearly
when it details the relationship between medical licensees and advanced
practice nurses. To engage in clinical practice, all advanced practice
nurses must compose a written collaborative agreement with a physician
or podiatrist.42 The agreement must describe the nature of the working re-
lationship between the advanced practice nurse and the medical licensee.43
Further, the agreement must specify which particular procedures the nurse
may only perform under direct supervision." The Nursing Act includes
additional provisions stating that the collaborating medical licensees con-
trol the filing and termination of the notice of delegation of prescriptive
authority to the Department of Professional Regulation.45 Further, as a
component of the written agreements, the medical licensee is not required
to delegate prescriptive authority to the advanced practice nurse, but may
exercise the discretion to do so.46
The Board of Nursing, comparable in scope to the physicians' medi-
cal board, is required to submit all proposed rules, amendments, second
notice materials, adopted rule or amendment materials, and policy state-
ments concerning advanced practice nursing to the medical board for re-
view and comment.4 7 This Act constitutes the legal and professional foun-
dation of advanced practice nursing in Illinois; even here, it allocates
39. 225 ILCS 65/50-10.
40. 225 ILCS 65/55-30(a)
41. 225 ILCS 65/60-35.
42. 225 ILCS 65/65-35.
43. Id.
44. Id. The collaboration requirements mirror the arrangement for the same types of parties detailed in the
Medical Practice Act. Compare 225 ILCS 65/65-35 and 225 ILCS 60/54.5.
45. 225 ILCS 65/65-35.
46. 225 ILCS 65/50-65.
47. 225 ILCS 65/50-65(d)
2010] 223
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
power in a way that reinforces advanced practice nurses' subservient role.
Though trained to perform many of the same tasks as physicians, they re-
main dependent upon the physician's authority. Advanced practice nurses
are not legally conceptualized as "medical" in nature, so they require the
approval and supervision of those practitioners who are.
B. Professional Sources of Power
Within the hierarchical context created by legislative allocations of
power, professional groups will lobby for additional authority. The suc-
cesses and failures of the different professional groups in the debates over
practice scopes are encumbered with substantial hierarchical implications.
As such, the groups go to great lengths to ensure their successes. Major
campaigns are launched for the specific purpose of advancing professional
groups' relative status and dominion.
In the early 19th century, medical societies were organized for the
sole purpose of obtaining a state-sanctioned power to control medicine
generally.48 As the push for reliance upon the scientific method gained
strength, doctors subscribing to it gained the right to mandate medical li-
censes as a prerequisite for the practice of medicine.4 9 This laid the foun-
dation for the legislative allocations of power, as detailed in the previous
section. As demonstrated in the SOPP, professional campaigns for power
continued to the present day. The American Medical Association (AMA)
is a frequent architect of these movements."o In the early and mid 20th
century, Morris Fishbein, the Secretary of the AMA, led a 50-year cam-
paign against chiropractors, saying they were like "rabid dogs" because
they were "playful and cute . . . but killers."5  The AMA characterized
chiropractors as unscientific and money-driven.52 Motivated by fears that
chiropractors would acquire the power to substantially influence the prac-
tice of medicine, the AMA created the Committee on Quackery in 1971."
Aided by the medical community's immense legislative power, the Com-
mittee fought vigorously to bar chiropractors from obtaining coverage un-
48. "The History of Medicine 1800-1850," Wellness Directory of Minnesota,
http://www.mnwelldir.org/docs/history/history03.htm (last accessed March 1, 2010).
49. Id.
50. The AMA is motivated by its view that "the vulnerable layperson requires protection form professional
experts .. . [and is] ignorant . .. even as to which profession . . . to consult." Walter J. Wardwell, Chiro-
practors: Challengers of Medical Domination, 2 Res. Soc. Health Care 207, 208 (1981).
51. "Chiropractic History: The AMA vs. Chiropractic," http://www.svpvril.com/amavchir.html (last ac-
cessed March 1, 2010).
52. "Chiropractic History: The AMA vs. Chiropractic," http://www.svpvril.com/amavchir.html (last ac-
cessed March 1, 2010).
53. Id.
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der Medicare, to divide chiropractic professional associations, to enable
state medical associations in their efforts to use legislation against the chi-
ropractic practice, and to prevent the formation of a chiropractic accredita-
tion agency.54 Not until the introduction of antitrust lawsuits against medi-
cal professional groups did the AMA reduce its diligent protest of the
chiropractors' possession of a position in the "medical" field. However,
the AMA continues to fight chiropractors under the notion that it is unsafe
and provides few medical benefits." Many states, to this day, do not allow
chiropractors to call themselves physicians; they follow a licensing pro-
gram separate from physicians, and are those not considered medical li-
censees." The AMA fight against the chiropractic practice demonstrates
the ways in which professional advocacy can be used to address hierarchy
in the healthcare system. The AMA's lobbying for exclusive control re-
flects the historical struggle to acquire authority found in the activities of
professional groups today.
In 2004, the American Association of College of Nursing's Task
Force on the Practice Doctorate of Nursing issued a position statement
recommending that the possession of a doctorate of nursing practice, or
D.N.P., be the minimum education level for entry into advanced nursing
practice." Physicians' groups became concerned that the doctor-nurse title
may confuse patients about the educational level and medical expertise of
their caregivers. In response, the AMA formed a coalition of national
medical specialty organizations and state medical societies, called the
Scope of Practice Partnership (SOPP). Members of the SOPP are collect-
ing data on licensure requirements, educational preparation, and scope of
practice legislation from each of the fifty states. The partnership is easily
comparable to the AMA's attack on chiropractic practice. They seek to
address the threats to medical licensees' authority posed not only by nurses
and advanced practice nurses, but other professional groups like optome-
trists and psychologists.59 The stated purpose is to develop model legisla-
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Examples include California, Texas, and Maine.
57. "Scope of Practice Partnership to Address 'Doctor-Nurse' Trend," American Academy of Family Phy-
sicians, http://www.aafp.org/online/en/home/publications/news/news-now/professional-
issues/20060403scope.html (last accessed March 1, 2010).
58. Id.
59. Michael Devitt, "AMA Creates 'Partnership' to Limit Other Providers' Scope of Practice,"
http://www.dynamicchiropractic.com/mpacms/dc/article.php?id=51219 (last accessed March 1, 2010). In a
commentary from the chair of the AMA Board of Trustees, attempts made by optometrists and psycholo-
gists to expand the scope of practice were referred to as "assaults on the practice of medicine." Edward L.
Langston, "Scope of practice: Need for continuing dialogue," http://www.ama-
assn.org/amednews/2008/06/02/edcaO6O2.htm (last accessed March 1, 2010).
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tion that would reinforce existing power disparity, using the lobbying
strengths of the medical associations. 60  Currently, non-medical licensees
face a number of legal constraints likely constructed at the urging of medi-
cal physicians; these include: laws relating to the unauthorized practice of
medicine, limitations on direct reimbursement to nonphysician providers,
laws that limit nonphysician providers' power to prescribe, and policies
excluding them from admitting practices at particular health care institu-
tions. The SOPP is a continuation of the efforts that led to these legal bar-
riers imposed upon nonmedical licensees.
In early 2006, a number of diverse health professions combined ef-
forts to fight the AMA's campaigns for increased control over medicine,
and they formed the Coalition for Patients' Rights (CPR).6' The Coalition
is made up of thirty-five professional associations whose members, mostly
nurses and psychiatrists, are regularly excluded from medical licensing
statutes and want more independence from medical licensees. CPR
"counters claims by medicine that all health professionals should be su-
pervised by physicians and regulated by entities comprised of physi-
cians."63 The CPR objects to the Partnership's creation of legislative re-
ports that attempt to de-legitimize non-medical health professions, and to
the Partnership's campaign against state and federal legislation addressing
the practice of other professional groups." It attacks the SOPP as "a
method to constrain nurse practitioners and other providers who are not
60. "Scope of Practice Partnership," supra note 57.
61. Linda L. Lindeke, & Karen KellyThomas, "The SOPP and the Coalition for Patients' Rights: Implica-
tions of Continuing Interprofessional Tension for PNPs," 24 J of Pediatric Health Care 62, 63 (2010).
62. Id. The members are: American Academy of Nurse Practitioners, American Association for Marriage
and Family Therapy, American Association of Colleges of Nursing, American Association of Critical-Care
Nurses, American Association of Naturopathic Physicians, American Association of Nurse Anesthetists,
American Association of Acupuncture and Oriental Medicine, American Association of Occupational
Health Nurses, American Chiropractic Association, American College of Nurse-Midwives, American Col-
lege of Nurse Practitioners, American Nephrology Nurses Association, American Nurses Association,
American Occupational Therapy Association, American Physical Therapy Association, American Psycho-
logical Association, American Psychiatric Nurses Association, American Speech-Language Hearing Asso-
ciation, Association of Nurse in AIDS Care, Association of Perioperative Registered Nurses, Association of
Rehabilitation Nurses, Association of Schools of Allied Health Professions, Association of Women's
Health, Obstetric and Neonatal Nurses, California Optometric Association, Emergency Nurses Association,
Hospice and Palliative Nurses Association, Integrated Health Policy Consortium, National Association of
Clinical Nurse Specialists, National Association of Nurse Practitioners in Women's Health, National Asso-
ciation of Pediatric Nurse Specialists, National Association of Nurse Practitioners in Women's Health, Na-
tional Association of Pediatric Nurse Practitioners, National Council of State Board of Nursing, National
League for Nursing, National Nursing Centers Consortium, National Organization of Nurse Practitioners
Faculties, Oncology Nursing Society, Preventive Cardiovascular Nurses Association, and Wound Ostomy
and Continence Nurses Society.
63. Lindeke, supra note 61.
64. Id.
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physicians."" The dynamic is perceived as being physicians versus all
other practitioners. The medical licensees want control over the other pro-
fessions, and the ability to supervise their work; the members of the Coali-
tion want more independent authority, or, conversely, to be subjected to
fewer controls from medical licensees when providing care to patients.
The groups have launched extensive campaigns in every state to gain fur-
ther power allocations from those who are in the position to give it to
them. Both the CPR and the SOPP are continuing the historical fight for
power within the healthcare hierarchy.
C. Judicial Allocations of Power
A cynical observer knows that where there are disagreements, there
are opportunities for lawsuits. This complicated struggle for power among
the health professions is no exception. Quite frequently, individual practi-
tioners, professional associations, and state regulators find themselves in
the courtroom challenging healthcare power allocations.6 They are seek-
ing the right to control particular procedures, treatments, diagnoses, or en-
tire corners of the medical market". Like Nurse Dock in 1917, courts gen-
erally submit to the wishes of the medical licensees; further, they broadly
defer to medical regulatory boards seeking to prohibit the delivery of par-
ticular health care services by persons holding a different license, or hold-
ing no license at all."
An illustration of judicial discretion used to reinforce medical licen-
sees' control is found in Am. Med. Assoc. v. Weinberger. 69 There, the
AMA (along with some patients, and some beneficiaries of Medicare and
Medicaid) sought to enjoin the Secretary of Illinois' Department of Health,
Education and Welfare from changing the utilization review process on the
grounds that it would interfere with the doctor-patient relationship.7 o The
AMA argued "the new regulations which mandate immediate review of
the doctor's decision to admit a patient have the effect of allowing [the
Department] to interfere with a function and duty traditionally reserved to
65. Id. at 64.
66. See State Bd. of Nursing v. Ruebke, 913 P.2d 142 (Kansas 1996) (holding that a practicing lay midwife
was not practicing medicine without a license), State Bd of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonaph,
123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. 2003) (involving a suit over an osteopathic physician's use of alternative medical
treatments in his family practice), and Am. Med. Assoc. v. Weinberger 522 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975) (in-
volving a suit over the state's reform to utilization review practices).
67. Id.
68. Hilliard, supra note 18.
69. Am. Med. Assoc. v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1975)
70. Id. at 921.
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qualified medical professionals."n Ultimately, the appellate court upheld
the lower court's grant of the injunction in favor of the AMA. 7 2 The appel-
late court found that the lower court did not err in considering that the new
regulations may have the effect of "directly influencing a doctor's decision
on what type of medical treatment will be provided, [and] thus directly in-
terfering with the practice of medicine."" The court's decision was, to a
significant degree, grounded in the plaintiff-professional association's de-
sire to remain in control of the way in which medicine is practiced. In do-
ing so, however, the court also acknowledged that the state retains some
powers to regulate medical services.74 This decision reinforces the notion
that the medical licensees, while ranking high in the healthcare hierarchy,
are still accountable to another entity. There is a balance in the powers to
be allocated to the medical profession, and those that are to remain in the
hands of the state regulators.
Additionally, patients themselves may help to alter the allocation of
power through malpractice claims. These lawsuits often ask courts to set-
tle disputes over the standard of practice. The effects of the suits can be to
either indirectly affirm physician control over medical procedures, or to
absolve the physician and place liability in the hands of another practitio-
ner for whom he is not responsible. One such case illustrating this is Pol-
lachek v. Dep't of Prof 1 Regulation." There, the plaintiff, a certified reg-
istered nurse anesthetist (CRNA), sought to permanently enjoin the Illinois
Department of Professional Regulation from enforcing § 1305.45(e) of its
regulation on Delivery of Anesthesia Services by a Certified Registered
Nurse Anesthetist. 76 The regulation specified that a CRNA may only pro-
vide anesthesia services in a physician's office if that physician has train-
ing and experience in the delivery of anesthesia services to patients.77 The
appellate court reversed the lower courts' order enjoining the enforcement
of the section. In doing so, it reasoned that the defendant-Department be-
haved neither arbitrarily nor capriciously.78 The court deferred to the De-
partment's Director's testimony, which was largely grounded in an interest
71. Id. at 925.
72. Id. at 927.
73. Id. at 925.
74. The court references a series of cases where the procedures by which the federal government was al-
lowed to determine whether or not to reimburse a practitioner: Johnson's Prof I Nursing Home v. Weinber-
ger, 490, F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1974), and Assoc. of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp.
125, No. 73 C 1653 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
75. Pollachek v. Dep't of Prof'1 Regulation, 854 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)
76. Id. at 723.
77. Id. at 724.
78. Id. at 736.
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in ensuring patients receive the utmost quality of care possible, with as few
risks to their welfare as possible.79 By the court's estimate, the regulations
were rational, and consistent with the interests of the public's health and
welfare."o The case is not only significant because of its outcome, but also
because of its reasoning. In the name of public interest, the court affirmed
physician control over nurse anesthetists. Rather than concerning itself
with cost or access (interests that were only casually mentioned), the court
put all its stock in quality control; further, its best estimate of quality pro-
tection involved reinforcing the superior status possessed by physicians
over non-medical licensees.
These and other decisions reinforce the notion that the system is one
of power allocations, and that the outcomes of those allocations are sig-
nificant for the patient population. Courts are given the opportunity to set
standards of practice, examine the impact a particular arrangement within
the hierarchy has on the public, and define the scope of healthcare profes-
sions according to their licenses and the needs of the system. Litigation is
an important component of the healthcare hierarchy, and its impact upon
the patient population is substantial.
III. THE EFFECTS OF POWER ALLOCATIONS ON THE
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Through legislation, professional advocacy, and litigation, power al-
locations are constantly being addressed and altered. The professional
groups' relative position to one another, and the control and authority that
comes with those positions, significantly impacts the patient population.
The effects can best be understood according to three patient interests:
quality, cost, and access.
A. Quality
One of the primary justifications a professional group offers when
seeking power in healthcare is an interest in maximizing the quality of ser-
vices." Practitioners charged with exceeding the designated scope of their
profession will regularly defend themselves by invoking their ability to
sufficiently match the quality demanded by the existing standards of prac-
tice." A fixation on quality as the standard against which power is allo-
79. Id. at 736-37.
80. Id. at 737.
81. See Pollacheck v. Dep't of Prof'1 Regulation, 854 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006), and Assoc. of Am.
Physicians & Surgeons v. Weinbereer, 395 F. Supp. 125, No. 73 C 1653 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
82. Id.
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cated is certainly admirable. The consequence of this fixation is rein-
forcement of medical licensees' control over other professional groups.
Physicians are the presumed superlative providers, and allocations are
made accordingly. Research indicates, however, that other professional
groups are sometimes able to provide comparable care - perhaps even bet-
ter care - than physicians.
Advanced practice nurses are now managing to compete with the
quality of services provided by medical licensees. Based on a review of
31 studies comparing doctors to nurse practitioners, nurse practitioners are
found to be at least as capable as physicians with regard to many primary
care functions.83 Further, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and cer-
tified nurse midwives, within the limits of their training, were also found
to provide "medical care similar in quality to that of physicians and at less
cost."84 Nurse midwives, in particular, perform exceedingly well when
compared to physicians. When examining fetal, prenatal, perinatal, and
maternal mortality rates, nurse midwives perform just as highly.s With
regard to low risk pregnancies, nurse midwives actually perform better sta-
tistically. 8 Furthermore, nurse practitioners are able to dedicate more
time to patient care and communication than physicians can. Nurse practi-
tioners possess better interpersonal skills, spend more time talking to pa-
tients, and provide better emotional support." As a result, patients of
nurse practitioners are better informed of ameliorative activities and the
importance of exercise than physicians' patients."
Unfortunately, because of the hierarchy of power in the American
healthcare system, nonphysician professional groups are underutilized.
Upon the advent of a generous health insurance system, physicians were
almost automatically reimbursed for whatever care they deemed neces-
sary.89 This practice had the affect of leaving physicians to determine what
constitutes proper medical care. 9 The judicial system reinforced physi-
83. Patricia A. Prescott & Laura Driscoll, Nurse Practitioner Effectiveness: A Review of Physician-Nurse
Comparison Studies, 2 Evaluation & Health Profs. 387, 388-389 (1979).
84. Edward S. Sekscenski et al., State Practice Environments and the Supply of Physician Asistants, Nurse
Practitioners, and Certified Nurse-Midwives, 331 New Eng. J. Med. 1266, 1266 (1994).
85. William J. Hueston & Mary Rudy, A Comparison of Labor and Delivery Management Between Nurse
Midwives and Family Physicians, 98 Annals Internal Med. 993, 995 (1983).
86. Ibid.
87. Alice N. Bessman, Comparison of Medical Care in Nurse Clinician and Physician Clinics in Medical
School Affiliated Hospitals, 27 J. Chronic Diseases 115, 124 (1974).
88. Beverly C. Flynn, The Effectiveness of Nurse Clinicians' Service Delivery, 64 Am. J. Pub. Health 604,
610 (1974).
89. E. Haavi Morreim, "Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility," 20 Am. J.L. & Med. 79, 80
(1994).
90. Id.
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cians' interests in dictating standards as they became legally responsible
for their own mistakes and the mistakes of the nonphysician care providers
with whom they worked. " Quality care, over time, became what medical
licensees decided it was. Importantly, as power allocations were made, the
standards of care were disproportionately within the exclusive authority of
physicians and they were enforceable against the other professional
groups.
As shown in the Illinois statutes, nursing is still conceptualized as the
second-tier profession to medical licensees. Their work is dependent upon
the physicians' use of their delegation powers. As early as 1972, research-
ers found that physicians were not delegating services to nurses as much as
they admitted they could.92 This is consistent with medical licensees' de-
mands for exclusive authority to provide particular medical services. The
allocation of exclusive authority to medical licensees must be reconsidered
in light of the fact that "alternative providers can safely perform many
health care tasks that they are currently prohibited from performing by
state laws . . . and that alternative providers can offer higher quality ser-
vices than physicians in certain circumstances."93 Aided by further re-
search, the institutions and individuals in charge of settling power disputes
must sharply seek out the decisions that enable all of the professional
groups capable of delivering quality care. Where nonphysicians are capa-
ble of providing the same quality as physicians, equal powers must be al-
located to both groups. Where physicians remain the only competent
group, their exclusive authority must be upheld. Allocations of power
within the healthcare system must be made with an eye toward maximiz-
ing access to quality care.
B. Cost
The often forgotten effect of allocating exclusive power to a profes-
sional group is the imposition of additional or higher costs. A cursory
glance at antitrust law validates the time-tested principle that markets with
fewer competitors have higher prices than markets with more competi-
tors.94 Combining this principle with the costs of medical educations and
high compensation expectations, exclusive authority in healthcare can
91. Id. at 83.
92. Eric L. Herzog, "The Underutilization of Nurses and Physician Assistants in Ambulatory Care,"
(Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Working Paper, 1974).
93. Lori B. Andrews, The Shadow Health Care System: Regulation of Alternative Health Care Providers,
32 Hous. L. Rev. 1273 (1996).
94. Andrew I. Gavil, et al., Antitrust Law in Perspective 2-4 (2d ed. 2008).
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drive up costs rather significantly.95 Medical licensees generally pay sub-
stantially more for their education than do non-medical licensees." Fur-
ther, they spend more time obtaining an education - one that is socially
perceived as being more arduous than the programs for other caregivers.
Consequently, costs are inevitably higher when physicians are granted the
exclusive control over procedures, treatments, diagnoses, and other profes-
sionals. While the scope of practice limitations are intended to protect
quality, they must be measured against the economic burdens they impose.
Comparing once again nurse midwives and physicians, the data sug-
gests that nurse midwives are able to reduce healthcare expenditures.
Looking at the care provided by midwives and physicians for similar pa-
tient populations, midwives' patients have the same health outcomes as the
physicians' patients do, and midwives use fewer pharmaceuticals, order
fewer tests and fewer cesarean sections.97 Physicians, then, are providing
more service than are necessary. Research like this is even more important
when taking into account the relative cost: nurse midwives can cost half as
much as their physician counterparts." Thus, the costs necessary to
achieve the care patients need are much lower under nurse midwives.
With increased delegation of authority to midwives, further savings could
be realized. Further, increased delegation to nonphysicians can lower costs
across the entire healthcare system. Increased usage of nurse practitioners
could save $6.4-8.75 billion annually.99 Significantly, approximately 75-
85% of adult primary care could be safely deferred to caregivers from al-
ternative health professions.'o Certainly, physicians have a broader exper-
tise, and tort law requires nonphysicians to refer complicated patients to
the more qualified medical licensees. However, this research indicates
that the lowering of costs can be achieved in some areas through more
delegation to non-medical caregivers.
Well-intentioned quality concerns allocate power in such a way that
places more patients directly in the hands of physicians; given the cost-
effectiveness and the sufficiency of quality found in other professional
95. Maggie Mahar, Money-Driven Medicine (1st ed. 2006).
96. Compare "Medical Student Education: Costs, Debt, and Loan Repayment Facts," Am. Assoc. of Med.
Colleges, http://www.aamc.org/programs/first/debtfactcard.pdf (last accessed on April 10, 2010), and
"2009-10 College Prices," CollegeBoard, http://www.collegeboard.com/student/pay/add-it-up/4494.html
(last accessed April 10, 2010).
97. "Birth of the Modern Midwife," http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/projects/spring2000/vanwagner/ health.htm (last
accessed 10 February 2010).
98. Id.
99. Len M. Nichols, Estimating Costs of Underusing Advanced Practice Nurses, 10 Nursing Econ. 343,
350 (1992).
100. Linda H. Aiken & William M. Sage, Staffing National Health Care Reform: A Role for Advanced
Practice Nurses, 26 Akron L. Rev. 187, 196 (1992).
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groups, however, power ought to be allocated differently. Patient access
to care is largely dependent upon affordability; regulators within the
healthcare system ought to take into account how access is affected by the
ways in which they impose or reduce costs through their allocations of
power.
C. Access
Certainly, patients' access to medical care can be diminished when
power allocations cause prices to increase. However, access can also be a
matter of geography. Suburban and rural communities may not have
within a reasonable distance the types of caregivers they require. Medical
specialists, other advanced practice caregivers, and complex healthcare fa-
cilities and technologies may all be out of reach because the market de-
mand for them may be too low in a particular region. Alternatively, urban
cities have sufficient market demand to offer a more comprehensive range
of services and professionals.' 1 Differences in access may necessitate de-
viations from traditional notions of hierarchy.
In the landmark case Sermchief v. Gonzales, the Missouri Supreme
Court correctly allocated power. There, the Court looked at a petition for
declaratory judgment from an agency serving low-income and rural popu-
lations.'O2 The East Missouri Action Agency delivered care to underserved
communities through a heavier reliance on advanced practice nurses."'
The patients they served often lacked health insurance and did not have the
means to pay for physicians' costs out of pocket.'04 The Agency used less
expensive, competent nurses to meet the patients' needs. Against a chal-
lenge from Missouri's state medical board, the Supreme Court upheld the
Agency's practices. In doing so, the Court likely chose to ignore the legal
issues presented by the nurses' practicing without the direct supervision of
a physician. It cited a lack of evidence of harm, and a necessary trend to-
ward broadening the scope of nursing as a profession.' This case is
unique in that it properly considers patient access to care as the guiding
criterion. It is this type of power allocation that needs to permeate the rest
of the healthcare system. As iterated previously, nurse midwives perform
well when compared to physicians; this is even true when looking at un-
101. Cite. One should note that the mere offering of a service might at times be insufficient, if the demand
for the service exceeds its supply.
102. Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. 1983).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 684.
105. Id. at 689.
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derprivileged patients, in spite of the fact that such patients present a
"greater risk for obstetric complications because of the relative nutritional
and psychosocial deprivation" stemming from their socioeconomic
status.' Seeing that advanced practice nurses can provide the same qual-
ity care as physicians - and at a lower cost - access can be safely pro-
moted by maximizing access to these nonphysician providers. Where geo-
graphic and socioeconomic hurdles limit patient access to medical
licensees, other qualified professional groups must be allowed to step in
and meet the demand for services. Depending upon how power is allo-
cated to these nonphysician groups, access can be severely inhibited or ex-
panded. Those in the position to regulate the professional hierarchy in the
healthcare system ought to seek out resolutions that favor patients' access
to care.
IV. CONCLUSION
Bernard Shaw's play and in Nurse Dock's account of professional re-
sponsibility inadvertently expose an issue that continues to permeate the
American healthcare system. Each told a diametrically opposed version of
how much faith should be placed in the physicians' hierarchy. Certainly,
when Nurse Dock detailed the deference owed to physicians, she was well
founded: physicians have a thorough education, and a proper medical sys-
tem will place a lot of faith in their ability to provide medical services.
For these and other reasons, physicians demand to be the central authority
on the provision of medical services. However, as shown in Shaw's play
and in this article, medical licensees are not without their limitations. As
such, doctors and nonphysician providers are in a persistent and compre-
hensive bid for power.
Health professional groups are using a number of means to acquire
power and reinforce their relative position with in the system. Through
legislative acts, professional advocacy, and litigation, each group is ac-
tively working to impose its authority to place itself alongside or above
other care providers. The battle is both local and national; it is incremental
and dramatic; and, undoubtedly, the battle is important for consumers of
medical services.
Every patient experience is dictated by the resolutions (or lack
thereof) to this battle among the professions. The resultant laws, regula-
tions, and court opinions can improve the quality of patient care, or they
106. Howard Blanchette, Comparison of Obstetric Outcome of a Primary-Care Access Clinic Staffed by
Certified Nurse-Midwives and a Private Practice Group of Obstetricians in the same Community, 172 Am.
J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 1864, 1864 (1995).
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can unnecessarily restrict access to quality care. The provision of author-
ity over particular services and technologies can substantially increase or
reduce the costs of services, which can in turn affect patient access. Fur-
ther, access to care can also be severely reduced if exclusive power is
granted to professionals who are unavailable in a particular geographic re-
gion.
Henceforth, patient care ought to be the primary focus of power allo-
cations. Each decision must be made with the best available data that
shows how patients would be affected. By deliberating over the potential
consequences of the legislative, political, and litigative resolutions accord-
ing to the three important factors - quality, cost, and access - the medical
hierarchy may be modified to achieve its actual purpose: the provision of
care to the people who need it. A balance of these factors will bring about
the most effective and sustainable way to meet the interests of the patient.

